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Leaving no-one behind? Social inequalities and contrasting development impacts
in rural Rwanda
Neil M. Dawson
School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
ABSTRACT
Two polar viewpoints have emerged regarding Rwanda’s post-genocide development: (1) that
economic development has improved the wellbeing of Rwandans and (2) that repressive policies
have negatively impacted many. Assessing the impacts and inclusiveness of policies through
trends among different social groups is timely in the context of the Sustainable Development
Goals’ pledge to ‘leave no-one behind’. This study examines rural Rwandans’ perspectives on the
changes affecting them. A multidimensional wellbeing approach was applied through mixed-
method research involving 115 rural households in two locations in western Rwanda, in 2011–
12. Findings reveal that the household-level impact was heavily influenced by socio-economic
power and socio-ethnic grouping. Negative impacts, including restricted freedom and loss of
material and cultural resources are disproportionately felt by the poorest. The indigenous Batwa
suffer particularly detrimental impacts. The findings suggest that strategies deemed successful in
making progress towards the Millennium Development Goals in Rwanda need, as a minimal
measure, to be supported by social protection programs that specifically target the landless,
vulnerable and cultural minorities. However, to align Rwanda’s development policies with the
ambitions of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a dramatic strategic shift is required to
‘leave no-one behind’ and avoid the reproduction of poverty and exacerbation of inequality.
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Introduction
The objectives of global development policy have shifted
in recent years, punctuated by striking differences
between the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Notably,
the underlying premise to ‘leave no-one behind’ rep-
resents a significant normative progression towards
more inclusive development (Pogge and Sengupta
2016; Biermann, Kanie, and Kim 2017): Thus the emer-
ging international development agenda and assessment
criteria embodied in the SDGs have moved beyond
income and asset ownership for the average citizen to
consider a diverse range of impacts, including for
example land tenure security and food insecurity, for
specifically disaggregated social and cultural groups,
such as indigenous peoples (Costanza, Fioramonti, and
Kubiszewski 2016). This leap in ambition necessitates
scrutiny of the strategies employed to pursue develop-
ment goals, to determine their suitability to realize a
more holistic and inclusive vision of development, and
to identify options to reinforce, adapt or replace those
strategies as necessary (Freistein and Mahlert 2016; Pro-
topsaltis 2017).
Rwanda provides a pertinent case through which to
explore the multiple objectives and diverse impacts of
recent development policy. Debates about Rwanda’s
post-genocide development, and particularly the
impact of policies on the Rwandan population, polarize
opinion. On the one hand, Rwanda is hailed as a
shining example to other sub-Saharan African nations
for the economic development which has been achieved
and the recorded improvements in the lives of Rwan-
dans. Economic growth has been consistently high for
over a decade and Rwanda aims to be a middle-
income country by 2020 (Crisafulli and Redmond 2012).
Alongside these national economic trends, the pro-
portion of the overall population suffering income
poverty rapidly decreased from 57% to 45% between
2006 and 2011(NISR 2012). Rwanda topped the list of
sub-Saharan African countries making progress towards
the MDGs (UN 2013), as reflected by a 17% drop in the
nation’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) from
2005 to 2010 (OPHI 2013).
Yet on the other hand, many take an opposing view
that the nature of policies introduced, the vision of mod-
ernization they embody and the way in which they are
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implemented to meet both political and economic
objectives has had considerable negative effects on the
freedoms and practices of Rwandans and placed unfair
burdens on some of the poorest in Rwandan society
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Pritchard 2013;
Ansoms and Cioffo 2016; Hasselskog 2017). Critics also
point out that the Rwandan population consists of
diverse groups with different levels of power not
equally represented in policies, not least the three
major ethnic groups: majority Hutu, minority Tutsi and
less than 1% indigenous Batwa, and subgroups among
them.
Since the end of the 1990s, numerous policies have
been implemented by the Rwandan state, which
combine strategies of reconciliation and development
to try to include all citizens in a newly conceived citizen-
ship (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Hasselskog 2015).
Indeed, national ‘development’ policies are rarely iso-
lated from prevailing political agendas, and comprise
multiple objectives influenced by international and
national aims and associated discourses (de Sardan
1988; Lewis and Mosse 2006). Alongside the resettle-
ment of large numbers of returning Rwandans after the
war and the process of rebuilding institutions, the state
has put forward a strong vision for the unity of Rwan-
dans, incorporating modernization, development and
the market orientation of a population consisting primar-
ily of subsistence farmers (Clark and Kaufman 2008).
These goals are often repeated through radio broadcasts,
frequent local meetings, ingando education camps, umu-
ganda monthly community services, and the appoint-
ment of local information officers (Purdeková 2008;
Waldorf 2011). The rhetoric embedded in these attempts
to persuade people to fulfill their potential to contribute
to the national economy and to modernize housing,
trade buildings and centers, maintain standards of
hygiene, embrace new technology, send children to
school, hold a bank account, medical insurance, take
credit and form cooperatives. Specific policies with
important implications for the rural population include:
universal basic education provided free to all, wide-
spread establishment of health centers and a national
health insurance scheme, eradication of grass roofs
nationwide through the ‘bye bye nyakatsi’ policy, a
zero-grazing policy to restrict livestock interactions
with crops, the villagization or imidugudu policy target-
ing the restructuring of scattered settlements through
the establishment of rural centers (Newbury 2011); the
crop intensification program and associated national
land policy which seek to promote a ‘green revolution’
through maximizing land utilization and setting pro-
duction targets for approved crops, facilitated by subsi-
dized seeds and chemical fertilizers (ROR 2004;
MINAGRI 2011; Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016). These
highly centralized policies are not simply guidelines for
desired behavior but are locally implemented and
strongly enforced by local leaders provided with cen-
trally-determined targets through a system of fines for
non-compliance (Ingelaere 2011; Chemouni 2014; Has-
selskog 2016). This suite of policies was applied
through the latter stages of the MDGs and has continued
into the current SDG era (Ansoms and Cioffo 2016; Harri-
son 2016).
Assessments of Rwanda’s post-genocide develop-
ment have been poorly supported by disaggregated
analyses or detailed case studies, and the impacts of
these far-reaching policies on rural Rwandans, the vast
majority of a rapidly growing population, remain
unclear. Firstly, policy monitoring provides insufficient
detail about how the poor are faring in Rwanda’s post-
genocide development because documented successes
often focus on aggregate national level data or, if disag-
gregated, tend to focus only on a limited selection of
socio-economic indicators (Holvoet and Rombouts
2008; Dawson 2015; Ansoms et al. 2017). The few
studies that disaggregate the Rwandan population in
some detail reveal that levels of inequality are high and
some have found rural poverty to be increasing
(Ansoms and McKay 2010; WFP 2012; Finnoff 2015).
These limitations also preclude a deeper understanding
of the trajectories of different cultural and ethnic
groups and interactions between them. This is an under-
standably sensitive research topic and explicit study of
such issues in Rwanda is forbidden. Indeed, the state
seeks to suppress attention to ethnic difference in
Rwandan society with reference to ethnic groups
removed from political representation, civil society and
social policy, to the extent that mention of ethnic differ-
ence in daily life can be punished as an incitement of
ethnic division or spreading of genocide ideology (Pur-
deková 2008; Reyntjens 2011). Counterproductively,
this also means that external, national-scale generaliz-
ations about power relations between Hutu and Tutsi
are common, and serves to problematize assessment of
the extent to which the rights of cultural minorities
with particular traditional practices and customary insti-
tutions, such as the Batwa, are being upheld (Beswick
2011).
Although the contrasting viewpoints about the
impacts of Rwanda’s development strategy appear irre-
concilable, this paper aims to illustrate why such diver-
gent assessments have arisen, (a) through a more
rounded look at the wellbeing of rural Rwandans and
assessment of impacts upon them, and (b) by exploring
the way in which social and institutional relations affect
the outcomes for different social and ethnic groups
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(though not including a gendered analysis). Through in-
depth qualitative study at two sites in western Rwanda,
the article sheds new light upon the way in which pol-
icies are being experienced by diverse rural inhabitants
and discusses implications for making progress towards
the inclusive development ambitions of the SDGs.
Specific attention is afforded to the indigenous Batwa,
who are rarely included in such analyses.
Methodology
Conceptual approach
The wellbeing approach applied for this study draws
frommultiple theories and disciplines but is heavily influ-
enced by Amartya Sen’s capability approach (Sen 1999;
Gough and McGregor 2007). To look beyond simple
material indicators, it seeks to represent ‘what a person
has, what they can do and how they think and feel
about what they both have and can do’ (McGregor,
McKay, and Velazco 2007). It therefore focuses on the
perceptions, values and experiences of participants
themselves. ‘What a person has,’ is represented by differ-
ent types of resources: natural, human, material, cultural
and social, similar to sustainable livelihoods approaches
(Bebbington 1999). ‘What they can do,’ represents the
wellbeing outcomes someone is able to achieve with
those resources. These outcomes include the capacity
to meet certain basic needs in addition to achieving
further goals regarding the quality of that person’s life.
Basic needs are conceptualized here along the lines of
Doyal and Gough (Doyal and Gough 1991), i.e. the level
(for different categories including health, food, water,
shelter, security) below which harm of an objective
kind will result for any individual, and are therefore con-
sidered relatively universal for all. The definition of well-
being utilized here also comprises a subjective
dimension or ‘how they think and feel about what they
both have and can do.’ It is this aspect of the definition
which, importantly for the analysis presented in this
paper, places the focus on an individual’s own perspec-
tive of what is important, the perceived value of different
resources and what represents a good quality of life to
them. Groups who apply different socially constructed,
subjective meanings to ways of living and acting often
occupy different relative positions of power in society
and this differential power influences the standard of
living they are able to achieve (Mosse 2010). Wellbeing
outcomes such as poverty may be seen in part as the
consequence of social categories and unequal power
relations between them (Cleaver 2005). This wellbeing
approach therefore necessitates attention to power
relations between different groups and institutions.
This article latterly tries to describe some of the social
and political dynamics which influence rural inhabitants’
wellbeing in Rwanda.
Study sites and sampling approach
The following sections present results of mixed methods
research (including six focus groups and 115 semi-struc-
tured interviews, described below) conducted in two
rural areas in western Rwanda: one in Nyamagabe district
in the southwest and the other in Rutsiro district in the
northwest (Figure 1). Both were remote, mountainous
areas lying over 2,000 meters above sea level, without
paved roads and with very limited public transport.
Study sites are not nationally representative. Instead
these areas were selected because they share character-
istics typical of much of western Rwanda, with challenges
to development caused by their remoteness from urban
centers and topographic and climatic constraints to agri-
culture-based livelihoods. Agriculture was the dominant
occupation in both areas, contributing to the income of
all but three of the 115 households. Both study sites were
also adjacent to protected forest areas, Gishwati Forest in
Rutsiro and Nyungwe National Park in Nyamagabe.
Research was undertaken in two villages in Nyama-
gabe district and, due to the greater segregation of cul-
tural groups, in four different villages in Rutsiro, over nine
months from October 2011. Several weeks were initially
spent at each site prior to formal research methods to
introduce the purpose of the research to villagers, to
gain the trust of and enhance mutual understanding
with participants and importantly to allow a choice of
whether to participate. Research participants in Rwanda
do not commonly express their true preferences to stran-
gers without attention to such factors (de Lame 2005)
and so continual reflection on the researcher-participant
relationship was particularly necessary to explore sensi-
tive issues of social and institutional relations and the
influence of policy discourse.1 The time spent in villages
prior to formal data collection was also used to enhance
understanding of local values and practices through par-
ticipant observation and informal interviews. This
allowed for a more informed selection of villages to
include within the study to capture some of the different
social groupings identified. The aim of sampling was to
encompass as much of the variation present in the
local population as possible rather than to represent pro-
portionally the wider rural population.
The study considers three separate socio-ethnic
groups of relevance to this location. Reverting to
simple ethnic labels of Tutsi and Hutu precludes a
deeper understanding of cultural difference (Schraml
2014), so instead, based on observation in the two
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study sites, distinctions are drawn between: (1) the Batwa
(16 of 115 interviews); (2) long-term rural inhabitants to
these mountainous areas (excluding Batwa), predomi-
nantly Hutu (72 interviews), and; (3) those who returned
to Rwanda from late 1994 from more fertile, less densely
populated environments in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), just one group which forms part of
Rwanda’s diverse Tutsi population (27 interviews).
Detail on the history of these groups regionally and in
the study localities is provided as supplementary infor-
mation. Although undoubtedly of importance, differen-
tiation by gender is outside the scope of this article.
Research methods
Focus groups were conducted in each village with a
random sub-selection of interview participants to under-
stand local conceptions of wellbeing and important
drivers of changes in wellbeing. The facilitator posed
one simple question regarding what it means to live
well in that particular village and sought only to encou-
rage further debate among the five to seven randomly
selected participants. Focus groups always consisted of
both male and female respondents. Semi-structured
interviews were then performed to capture household
level information regarding material wellbeing (in
terms of material assets and ability to meet basic
needs), subjective values held and the various changes
which were perceived to have had an influence on the
wellbeing of that household. Interviews were held in
more than 10% of households in each village (between
15 and 20 in each village, 115 in total) with respondents
selected at random from lists provided by local adminis-
trators. Quantitative data such as livestock and land hold-
ings were commonly verified to check size and amount.
Interviews took place with either household head or
spouse. 42% of interview respondents were male, 58%
female and 19% of those households had a female head.
From interview responses, more than 20 different
income strands were identified in the two sites, and
these were reduced to four categories to assign house-
holds to a socio-economic group. These groups con-
sisted of households characterized by: (1) lower paid
activities such as agricultural laboring or transporting
goods; (2) more regular or higher paid laboring options
such as tea labor, charcoal making, trade of low value
goods or shepherding; (3) trade of own farmed crops,
trees, cash crops, running a shop or taxi, or; (4) more pro-
fessional occupations such as administration or local
government, teachers or mechanics.
Results
Trends in commonly-measured socio-economic
indicators
Elements of participants’ wellbeing improved consider-
ably over the 10-year period to 2011/12. Provision of
communal water taps during that time meant that
every household could satisfy their basic need of year-
round access to clean water (Table 1). Education levels
Figure 1. Map showing the two districts in which study sites were located.
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increased substantially, evident by the pronounced
difference between those of household heads and their
children (Table 1). In 2011/12 only a minority of house-
holds lacked a single member with five years’ education
or more (Table 1), an indicator given high priority in the
MPI, making up one sixth of the index score compared to
one eighteenth for clean water, housing or sanitation
standard (Alkire and Santos 2014). Twenty-six percent
of households attained this level of education in the pre-
ceding 10 years reflecting a rapid decrease in ‘multidi-
mensional poverty’. The universal basic education
policy (up to eight years) was introduced nationwide
and in many cases incentivized through the provision
of free meals. Therefore, few children of schooling age
do not attend. Within the 10 years to 2012 health
centers were built at each of the two sites, cutting
travel time to the nearest modern health facility,
meaning that many more illnesses can be treated
locally and births now take place in medical centers
attended by health professionals (Basinga et al. 2011).
Rapid change has also occurred in some aspects of
housing. Whereas in 2010 many rural homes were
made with grass roofing, by late 2011 all rural homes
in this study area, including the most basic constructions
of earth and sticks, had modern roofs (Table 1). This
change was enacted through the prohibition of natural
roofing materials under the ‘bye bye Nyakatsi’ policy.
Incomes and consumption potential have also increased
for many households and are discussed in further detail
in the next section.
Locally-grounded indicators of wellbeing and
poverty
Though the provision of services such as education,
health and water improved greatly, this did not equate
with local perceptions of trajectories in poverty and well-
being. In contrast, many of the rural participants in this
study maintained that they had become less well-off
and less able to meet their basic needs. To explain the
discrepancy it is important to explore local conceptions
of wellbeing and poverty. The results of focus group
meetings revealed a strong consistency with factors con-
sidered to be priorities in each village. These generally
included: land; livestock; employment; health; housing;
infrastructure; social relations and sharing; and finally
autonomy over land use and investment decisions.
Each of these elements were highlighted in at least five
of the six focus group discussions. This list differs in
several important ways to widely used indicators such
as the Human Development Index or Multidimensional
Poverty Index. Education, though commonly included
in normative indicators of wellbeing and poverty, was
notably absent. Returns to basic education are often
very low in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barouni and Broecke
2014) and interview respondents frequently cited
examples of people who had completed their basic edu-
cation but did the same unskilled work for the same pay
as those less educated.
Land and livestock (particularly to provide manure to
fertilize the land) were commonly prioritized resources,
which rarely feature in poverty indicators. Participants
felt that without them people struggled to meet the
need to provide sufficient food for their household.
This clear response is not surprising in an area where
topography and climate places severe constraints on
food production and where a large proportion of the
population farm for subsistence. Access to land was
low with an average holding of less than one hectare
(Table 2).
Variation in wellbeing and development impacts
by socio-economic group
Land was distributed very unequally among participants:
the lowest two socio-economic groups (44% of house-
holds) held on average less than a quarter of a hectare
and just 15% of households owned 55% of the total
area (Table 2). Only 30% of households earned any
income from trading surplus crops. This paucity of land
and income-earning potential explains the high pro-
portion of households, particularly from poorer socio-
economic groups who suffer regular food scarcity
(having to go at least one entire day per month
without a single meal, Table 2). This situation was
found to be deteriorating rather than improving. Further-
more, land inequality had increased over the 10 years to
2012 (Table 2). Population increase (including
Table 1. Selected socio-economic indicators by socio-economic group in 2011/12.
Farm laborers
(n = 24)
Mixed labor or
traders (n = 26)
Self-employed/
workers (n = 41)
Professional or
diversified (n = 24)
Average
(n = 115)
Access to clean drinking water 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Average education of household head (years) 2.0 1.8 3.2 5.8 3.2
Average of maximum education in household (years) 4.3 3.8 7.9 10.3 6.7
% households in which nobody has 5 years education or more 54% 69% 22% 4% 36%
Household member has acquired 5 years education in last 10 years 29% 19% 37% 13% 26%
House has modern roof of zinc sheets or tiles 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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resettlement) and the subsequent intensification of land
use, reduced fallow periods and reductions in livestock
contributed to reduced productivity and decreasing
land holdings. However, the passing of land to children
or division of land for returnees was reported as the
primary cause of decreased land holdings for only 4%
of households. Instead political and economic factors
meant land was being redistributed within the popu-
lation, with 42% of those in the highest wealth category
able to increase their holdings while 42% of those in the
lowest two categories (farm laborers and mixed laborers)
saw their land holdings decrease (Table 2).
The redistribution of land away from poorer house-
holds appeared to have been exacerbated by policies.
Specifically, changes in land holdings were driven by
the Rwandan land policy and subsequent crop intensi-
fication program, which had placed considerable
restrictions on people’s freedom to use land as they
wished and created tenure insecurity through the
threat of expropriation for non-compliance (Dawson,
Martin, and Sikor 2016). The costs of obtaining fertilizer
and the importance of combining manure acted as a
barrier to poorer households participating in (obliga-
tory) agricultural policy schemes, to the extent that
only 29% of the 115 households in this study applied
fertilizers to their land (Table 2). Negative perceptions
of the policy and its impacts were frequently voiced
when interviewees were asked ‘Have you made any
change to your farming methods?’ Reasons given
related primarily to the constraints on the ability of
households to subsist and the reduction of tenure
due to the potential for the government to reallocate
land to wealthier households who could afford
various inputs. The reduction in tenure security acceler-
ated redistribution as poorer households became more
likely to sell land to wealthier households. The threat of
land reallocation was considered a very real possibility,
and 15 of the 115 households in this study had experi-
enced being expropriated from land due to agricultural
and forest policies within the last 10 years, three of
them within the previous year in relation to crop
specialization.
Rapid reductions in livestock holdings among the
rural population (Table 2) were a factor preventing
people from investing in trade and agricultural inputs.
Reductions in livestock occurred due to the increased
living costs associated with: buying medical insurance
to access health facilities or meeting medical costs; the
cost of school materials for children; costs of buying
food that people could no longer produce themselves,
or; expenses incurred to comply with modernization pol-
icies such as ‘bye bye nyakatsi’. The prohibition of
grazing on public land meant cattle must be caged
and fodder be collected daily to feed them, which
places a considerable burden on rural smallholders (Klap-
wijk et al. 2014). Forty-four percent of participants cited
one or a combination of these reasons when questioned
as to why they had substantially reduced their livestock
holdings and only 12% of households had been able to
sustain or increase their holdings.
The restrictions placed on people’s choices through
these different policies explain the high priority partici-
pants place on autonomy as an important component
of a good life. The same result can be found in other
studies relating to Rwandans’ subjective wellbeing
(Abbott and Wallace 2012; Ingelaere 2014). Its inclusion
here was primarily justified with reference to specific pol-
icies. For example, tenure over land, housing and live-
stock was beginning to be affected by the villagization
policy, which was in the early stages of implementation
in the study areas during 2011/12. The policy aims to
bring the entire rural population of the country into clus-
tered settlements by 2020, ostensibly to provide services
and better housing (ROR 2007). Local authorities had
begun to sensitize and strongly encourage some
remote households to move to central locations.
Eleven interviewees (10%) voiced tenure security con-
cerns for their homes and nearby land due to villagiza-
tion. Some of those had already experienced
considerable impacts, having to sell land and livestock
Table 2. Contextually relevant socio-economic variables by socio-economic group (changes refer to the preceding 10 years to 2011/12).
Farm laborers
(n = 24)
Mixed labor or traders
(n = 26)
Self-employed/ workers
(n = 41)
Professional or diversified
(n = 24) Average
Average land size (hectares) 0.16 0.25 0.99 2.18 0.89
Trade of crops 4% 0% 41% 67% 30%
Food scarcity 88% 42% 34% 13% 43%
Loss of agricultural trade 21% 58% 56% 33% 44%
Land decreased 38% 46% 32% 33% 37%
Land increased 4% 8% 22% 42% 19%
Fertilizer 13% 19% 34% 46% 29%
no livestock 67% 27% 15% 29% 31%
Own 1 or more cows 0% 23% 63% 58% 40%
Reduced livestock holdings 13% 42% 66% 71% 50%
Without medical insurance 46% 54% 41% 21% 41%
Government pay medical insurance 42% 35% 10% 0% 19%
6 N. M. DAWSON
to afford the higher costs of moving to a central location
against their wishes.
It is noteworthy that, despite these negatively per-
ceived and experienced policy impacts, common
poverty measures such as income levels and consump-
tion potential may, counterintuitively, reflect positive
impacts. The redistribution of land to wealthier house-
holds and reduction in subsistence activities increased
the need for many to seek income from other sources
and buy food from markets. The main options available
were agricultural laboring for local landowners,
working on tea plantations or being involved in timber
and charcoal production from the increasing number
of private forests, in response to rising urban demand.
The livelihood shift towards employed labor results, for
many, in increased incomes and consumption potential
while the shift away from subsistence farming and
increased marketization results in reduced food security
and perceived increases in poverty. Those impacts are
exacerbated by occasional sharp, seasonal fluctuations
in the price of staple foods such as beans, sweet potatoes
and potatoes. For example, over six months in 2012
potato prices more than doubled while wages did not
increase (Mbonyinshuti 2012). Price increases had been
so severe during this time that 94% of participants
stated that their families had changed the types of
food they ate or reduced the number of meals they ate
per day.
The reduction in material wellbeing for many rural
inhabitants also explains why 41% of those interviewed
were unable to afford health insurance and access
health care, despite improved proximity to these services
and almost one-fifth of households having medical insur-
ance costs waived by the government (Table 2). Medical
insurance cost 3000 Rwandan francs (c.US$4.50) per indi-
vidual in 2012, though no household member was
allowed access to treatment unless all household
members had paid for their insurance.
Variation in wellbeing and development impacts
by socio-cultural group
Although no questions specifically addressing ethnicity
were posed, cultural difference was a clear indicator in
the data collected. Differences were stark in terms of
the resources each socio-ethnic group had access to
and the outcomes they could achieve (Table 3). Most
strikingly, land and livestock holdings were negligible
for the Batwa, while being clearly highest for returnees
from DRC, with long-term residents intermediate
(Table 3). The absolute poverty faced by Batwa house-
holds was evident as 94% faced food scarcity (going
at least one day a month eating no meals and often
much more frequently than that), 100% were reliant
on collecting firewood illegally for warmth and
cooking, being unable to produce or afford to buy
any, and 59% struggled to meet their basic needs of
adequate shelter and lived in very small constructions
of earth and sticks. Many of those living in more
robust houses had received them from the government
(Table 3).
In contrast to other groups, conceptions of wellbeing
for the Batwa rested on finding laboring opportunities
and on access to forest resources, despite hunting and
other forest uses having been prohibited for many
years. The forest played a clear role in their culture and
livelihood activities. Even once removed from forests,
they collected and sold forest resources to non-Batwa
such as firewood, material for ropes, honey, medicinal
plants and wild meat. But the increased protection of
forests meant that the risks involved had increased
thus reducing these practices rapidly. At both sites,
Batwa were acutely aware that their own activities
were not proven causes of deforestation and perceived
that they had been treated unjustly through that
process. As one male Batwa expressed:
That (the forest) was our source of livelihood, where we
got everything and we do not find any alternative… …
Our culture is starting to disappear. Like knowing how to
look for honey, our children no longer know how that is
done.… ..The forest now is for the government and for
people who got jobs in the forest… .. For us we can
only look at it like a poster!. (Focus group discussion
with seven Batwa participants, Rutsiro District, 2nd May
2012)
Although the evicted Batwa were provided with land and
latterly with housing, adapting to becoming farmers was
not easy. At that time, many of the Batwa were in a
similar economic position to the returnees having been
provided with land and housing by the government. Yet
instead of being able to adapt and become aligned with
the dominant culture, or alternatively to seek represen-
tation to enable them to negotiate a favorable outcome,
the majority sold their land and spent the money
quickly, seeking jobs collecting grasses or carrying char-
coal when they neededmoney again. Despite the beneﬁts
of provided housing, particularly to health and the survival
of children, many Batwa were still acutely aware of their
poverty and relatively low material wellbeing.
Through the trade and exchange of forest goods, the
Batwa had always interacted with other groups outside
of the forest, but were not treated as equals. Although
there had been a substantial change in the way Batwa
were treated by others, relations had changed from
physical abuse and discrimination to mere discrimi-
nation. As described by a female Batwa resident:
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Nobody here gets beaten anymore without any reason.
We could be struck by people as we were accused of
stealing. Or even people would say ‘what right do you
have to be taking this path?’ and could beat us. We
couldn’t take those cases to anyone to seek justice
because they were the very people who would beat
us.. (Focus group discussion with seven Batwa partici-
pants, Rutsiro District, 2nd May 2012)
Even from the small sample of Batwa households in this
study, there were examples from the past ﬁve years of
signiﬁcant amounts of wages, livestock and equipment
being stolen collectively from the Batwa by non-Batwa
who acted as organizers of cooperatives and projects
for them. And although they have become more
accepted by others and are more able to ﬁnd jobs as
agricultural laborers, they voiced resentment at not
being considered for higher paid types of work, even
unskilled jobs such as cleaning or security guards. A
male Batwa focus group participant complained that:
Sweeping doesn’t require somebody with school qualifi-
cations, or at least to be a guard you don’t need a high
level of education! Even the guards there at the sector
offices are no stronger than us. They are the same like
us but we aren’t chosen for that work, you can’t find a
Batwa working there. Having a sustainable job doesn’t
require just education, your ethnicity is a factor. (Focus
group discussion with seven Batwa participants, Rutsiro
District, 2nd May 2012)
Batwa were rarely involved in organizations alongside
non-Batwa. Although honey was an important forest
resource to them, none were involved in honey coopera-
tives established at the two sites. In Nyamagabe, where
Batwa lived alongside other groups, neighbors would
commonly pay minimal amounts to Batwa to go and
collect grasses or ﬁnd ﬁrewood from protected forests,
incurring a large amount of risk. Most were keen to
return to their old homes alongside other Batwa,
despite their improved housing conditions.
The main occupations provide a strong indication of
the variation in socio-economic position between
households in each of the three groups (Figure 2).
More than half of Batwa households depended only on
agricultural labor, transporting materials or collecting
grasses, as opposed to only a very small minority of retur-
nees and less than a fifth of long-term residents. During
focus group discussions both returnees and long-term
residents placed land as the key resource required to
live well. However different choices in land use were
indicative of some cultural differences as only 26% of
returnees traded crops (Table 3), a far lower proportion
than long-term residents despite their greater land hold-
ings. Returnees had instead begun to plant trees to
engage in the charcoal and timber trade (52% of retur-
nee households). The majority also reared cows (55%,
Table 3) to enable them to consume and trade milk. Edu-
cation levels tended to be much higher among returnees
(Table 1) who overwhelmingly occupied the higher two
livelihood categories, with 37% of households receiving
income from professional or diversified occupations, a
proportion of which were as local administrators with
decision-making powers.
After the challenges posed by resettlement, many
returnees who stayed in their new villages had been
able to adapt and accumulate resources relative to
other groups. When others decided to leave, they com-
monly sold the land they had been provided with to
fellow returnees, something commonly highlighted as
inequitable by long-term residents. The achievement of
a favorable relative position, emphasized by their
greater relative land and livestock holdings (Table 3),
was partly explained by their political representation.
Returnees collectively influenced decision-making and
negotiated outcomes suited to their experience and
culture. For example, returnees in Rutsiro had been
able to argue against keeping livestock caged at home
and instead converted crop land to a landscape scarcely
seen in Rwanda, of rolling green pastures where cattle
roamed monitored by shepherds, in place of the patch-
work of cropland that typifies the rest of the country.
Table 3. Socio-economic data by socio-ethnic group and study site (changes refer to the preceding 10 years to 2011/12).
Social-ethnic groups Study areas
Long term residents
(n = 72)
Returnees from DRC
(n = 27)
Twa
(n = 16)
Nyamagabe
(n = 40)
Rutsiro
(n = 75) Average
Average land size (hectares) 0.72 1.78 0.22 1.20 0.74 0.89
No livestock 21% 30% 76% 23% 36% 31%
Own 1 or more cows 42% 55% 6% 38% 41% 40%
Food scarcity 27% 52% 94% 53% 37% 43%
Very basic small house 15% 18% 59% 35% 15% 21%
Collect firewood illegally 63% 52% 100% 57% 83% 66%
Trade of crops 37% 26% 6% 50% 19% 30%
Average of maximum education in
household (years)
6.1 10.3 3.8 7.4 6.4 6.7
Without medical insurance 49% 26% 29% 28% 48% 41%
Government pay medical insurance 11% 7% 71% 13% 23% 19%
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In contrast to returnees, only a small minority of
long-term residents could be classed as having diversi-
fied or professional livelihoods, with most occupied by
traditional modes of agriculture on relatively small land
parcels (Figure 2). These subsistence practices meant
relatively few long-term residents suffered food scarcity,
yet also meant higher proportions were unable to
afford expenses such as medical insurance (Table 3).
The agricultural and associated social practices of
long-term residents conflicted with the vision of
modern, profit maximizing rural inhabitants supported
by government policies. Many of the remainder
suggested that they would likely sell their land rather
than see it reallocated because of their inability to
grow approved crops successfully. In the meantime,
many risked fines by continuing to practise polyculture,
provoking potential conflict with local authorities. The
social relations and practices built around traditional
farming practices are also contrary to the vision of a
modern Rwandan and local authorities sought to dis-
mantle them by actively preventing the traditional
gatherings by which much sharing took place
(Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016). A minority of weal-
thier individuals and particularly young, educated
adults from wealthier households were very dismissive
of past traditions and felt part of the new movement
towards modernization. However, relatively poor long-
term residents frequently referred to the rapid
reduction in levels of sharing of harvests, meals, labor
and resources between households, social protection
mechanisms which had been part of village life in the
past but had diminished due to developmental policies
and discourses surrounding marketization.
Exceptions to the rule: inconsistencies in status
between socio-cultural groups
Wellbeing and cultural identities were not uniform for all
Batwa. Despite rejection of their cultural practices and
the discrimination they are subjected to, some Batwa
appeared to be affected by the discourse surrounding
a new Rwandan culture (although here perceptions of
the researchers may have some influence on responses).
As one respondent explained, ‘The culture has changed,
and because of the new vision of development it has to,’
adding that despite the hardships they have faced in
transitioning away from forest-based livelihoods, that
‘now we feel like it was the right thing to do.’ Whereas
some had only been recently removed from forest
areas or may even still practice some forest use, others
have never known these connections in their lifetimes.
Batwa may move between areas and many in Rutsiro
had come from semi-urban areas to the newly formed
settlement. Others had lived only a few miles from the
forest, yet it played little part in their lives. In trying to
discuss common Batwa cultural values, conversations
revealed frequent disagreement, even regarding
whether forest access should be granted or not.
There were also examples of Batwa who were suffi-
ciently empowered to transform their household’s for-
tunes. One man refused to accept rejection from a tea
plantation job on ethnic grounds, instead successfully
pleading for a chance to prove himself, which may ulti-
mately enable other Batwa to do the same. Similarly,
one female household head overcame corruption
when denied access to donated livestock for refusing
to pay the associated bribe to local officials. She
Figure 2. Occupations across the three broad socio-cultural groups.
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sought justice at sector and district levels and although
dissuaded at several stages, she persisted and eventually
became the only Batwa in this study to own a cow
(Table 1).
Power relations between residents and returnees
were not consistent between the two sites. In Nyama-
gabe a small group of long-term residents formed the
elite, dominating local organizations and economy.
Their families were given land in Nyamagabe in the
1980s as part of the European Commission Development
Project. They found continued options for work and
gained tenure over unused land after the project
ceased operating in 1993. Six of these long-term resident
households were interviewed as part of the random
sample and their average land holding was 2.9 hectares
as opposed to just 0.27 hectares for the other 23 long-
term residents sampled there. This group therefore
formed a substantially wealthier class of about 40 house-
holds in the area, some of whom had been able to
accumulate sufficient wealth to send their children to
private schools, acquire more land and livestock and
who provided laboring opportunities to others in the
area. This drives the difference in average land size
between study areas (Table 3). This group formed coop-
eratives for cultivating, livestock and for tea growing, for
which membership costs were prohibitive to others,
including many returnees. Returnees in Nyamagabe
struggled to accumulate wealth and most retained
small, basic houses alongside the Batwa, located on a dis-
tinct hillside to the larger homes of longer-term
residents.
Discussion and conclusion
Rwanda has undergone enormous change since the mid-
1990s. The enacted state-led political agenda represents
a significant alteration to the lives and livelihoods of
ordinary Rwandans (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012;
Hasselskog 2015). Considerable successes have been rea-
lized and recorded, particularly through the provision of
services to rural areas including clean drinking water,
education and health facilities alongside consistent
economic growth (UN 2013). However, to evaluate
trends in poverty and wellbeing and draw conclusions
about the effectiveness of development policies necessi-
tates a focus beyond objective measures such as asset
ownership and years of education, to consider more
context-specific values and practices which may deter-
mine experiences of change (Ravallion 2011; Shaffer
2013). This study in western Rwanda reveals that stan-
dard measures of poverty based on income, consump-
tion or even broader measures such as the
Multidimensional Poverty Index, fail to reflect even
material factors that are crucially important to the lives
and wellbeing trajectories of rural Rwandans. Due to
lack of adaptation to context and inattention to social
and cultural diversity, standard poverty indices are
shown to be a mirage detracting attention from some
of the most important changes in key resources for
rural inhabitants. These findings have considerable impli-
cations for the strategic transformation required to align
with emerging international norms of inclusive develop-
ment, reduced inequality and eradication of all forms of
poverty manifest in the SDGs.
While Rwanda’s development policies have been
deemed successful through limited impact evaluations,
this locally-grounded and socially disaggregated assess-
ment reveals those same policies have exacerbated
inequality and imposed considerable burdens and
restrictions on some of the poorest in Rwandan society.
Strategies to modernize and marketise the rural
Rwandan population serve to redistribute valued
resources away from the poorest and most marginal
towards the wealthiest and most powerful who are
able to comply and accumulate, supporting descriptions
of the suite of top-down policies as ‘internally exclusive’
(Purdeková 2008). The policy strategies employed in
Rwanda may therefore require reconsideration or sub-
stantial buttressing through targeted pro-poor initiatives
to align with the SDGs, including SDG 10 to reduce
inequality and SDG 1 to eradicate poverty.
Land and livestock are particularly important
resources to rural Rwandans, and evidence at the
national level, supportive of the findings presented
here, shows trends of increasing inequality in ownership
and decreasing access for the poor (Finnoff 2015). The
omission of land and livestock from development indi-
cators enables positive trajectories in the wellbeing of
Rwandans to be publicly presented even as the
poorest are rapidly losing the land, livestock and
related food sufficiency on which their wellbeing
depends. The inclusion of indicators relating to food
insecurity and land tenure within SDGs 1 and 2 (Smith,
Rabbitt, and Coleman-Jensen 2017) therefore represents
important progress with scope to inspire reassessment of
Rwanda’s policy direction. However, their progressive
influence is likely to be hampered by: lack of existing
data and therefore inability to retrospectively assess
trends; limited capacity to collect data, and; a likely
focus on legally recognized property rights rather than
historic or customary tenure, including non-consider-
ation of forest tenure for groups such as the Batwa. To
mitigate the ongoing processes of land and livestock dis-
possession among the poorest Rwandans, caused in part
by agricultural policies with developmental aims, pro-
grams must be introduced to specifically support land
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access and tenure security for those with little or no land,
to protect against the likelihood of the poor needing to
sell land to meet other costs (often associated with
development policies) and to enable the continuation
of subsistence activities, associated social practices and
local trade systems.
Development policies should not be judged on
material outcomes alone, but should also consider
impacts on non-material values and quality of govern-
ance. Participants in this study emphasized non-material
social and political factors such as social relations and
levels of autonomy for people to make their own
decisions as important factors in the way people experi-
ence change. The governance of change in Rwanda has
consisted of centrally-designed and strongly-enforced
‘development’ policies, which have imposed a transform-
ation and placed considerable demands on their subjects
(Gaynor 2014). The Rwandan political system shows little
sign of transformation to more inclusive governance.
With the aim to transform Rwandans into marketized,
modern individuals, many restrictions have been
placed on their own valued practices (for subsistence,
social and cultural as well as economic purposes). As
little scope is provided for choice, gradual adaptation
or local negotiation, those restrictions act as important
mechanisms through which people perceived and
experienced impact. Rwanda’s land and agricultural pol-
icies have caused particularly negative impacts on rural
communities (Van Damme, Ansoms, and Baret 2014;
Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016). Despite the confound-
ing, gradual effects of growing population, results of this
study further detail mechanisms by which negative
policy impacts are suffered, such as the centralized impo-
sition of crop types at the regional scale, repression of
farming and social practices, and state-induced insecur-
ity of tenure over land and property. Such factors are
given little attention in the economic analyses which
dominate evaluation of impacts on the Rwandan popu-
lation. Yet such key components of governance quality
should receive considerable attention and scrutiny as
part of approaches to pursue SDG 16: ‘Promote peaceful
and inclusive societies for sustainable development,
provide access to justice for all and build effective,
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.’ This
goal includes targets for: representation of different
societal groups in decision-making bodies; the existence
of effective independent human rights institutions; the
nature of interactions between citizens and government
officials; perceived levels of discrimination and harass-
ment, and; perceived inclusiveness and responsive of
decision-making. The extent to which such international
norms gain traction in Rwanda and are adopted,
assessed, scrutinized by key state, non-governmental
and private sector donors and partners and embedded
in Rwanda’s development policies will have a key influ-
ence on the lives of rural Rwandans going forward.
Rural Rwandans differ considerably in the way they
value different resources and practices and are therefore
affected in diverse ways by changes. In general, long-
term residents, returnees from DRC and Batwa all dis-
played different preferences and practices, particularly
regarding land use, which serve to reflect their different
cultural knowledge and practices. There was also con-
siderable spatial and social segregation between these
groups. In the two rural areas in this study, returnees
and wealthier long-term residents were more aligned
with the state’s envisioned transformation, and have uti-
lized their own capacity but also relatively strong rep-
resentation to attune to the new discourse defining
Rwandan culture and citizenship. Many of these local
elites pour derision on the ways in which they used to
act: not seeking to accumulate wealth, not wearing
shoes, using traditional materials in place of modern
alternatives. In contrast, the values and preferred prac-
tices of others are being rapidly and forcefully eroded
and subsumed.
Material accumulation is not new to rural Rwandans,
but in the past those objectives functioned alongside a
locally-focused subsistence economy and associated
social and cultural systems. Many poorer long-term resi-
dents lamented restrictions on their lives, including tra-
ditional gatherings and goods. For the large proportion
of rural inhabitants unable to live up to the vision of a
Rwandan citizen, such as those unable to afford soap,
school materials for their children or the large pro-
portion of people unable to buy medical insurance
(let alone invest in new agricultural technologies), the
loss of local social and economic systems and increased
economic burdens associated with modernization pol-
icies serve to emphasize difference and represent a
process of marginalization of the poor. The unequal
power between groups, divided on interrelated socio-
economic and socio-cultural grounds, played a strong
role in the reproduction of social status, an effect
which has been documented in other countries, includ-
ing neighboring Tanzania (Cleaver 2005). Although
SDGs appear, commendably, to disaggregate indicators
by gender, age, disability and indigenous groups, the
lack of attention to social and cultural difference,
values and practices has been heavily criticized by cul-
tural minorities and indigenous groups (Briant Carant
2016). Given the political suppression of cultural diver-
sity and non-recognition of the indigenous Batwa to
date, Rwanda is unlikely to take a more progressive
stance on this issue than any international policy
templates.
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The majority of Batwa were excluded both from their
traditional forest dwellings and livelihoods on one hand,
and on the other also excluded from the economic diver-
sification and market integration pursued by and pro-
moted for other rural inhabitants. Many of them exist
outside of either the traditional or the modern, excluded
from both the old and the envisioned new ways of life.
Although some Batwa appeared supportive of the Gov-
ernment’s modernization policies, many more perceive
this to be a crucial time for both their culture and
ability to meet basic needs. Negative stereotyping,
denial of rights and segregation are all features of
Batwa life (Kidd 2008) and of the countries inhabited
by Batwa, Rwanda provides the least access to traditional
forest land or compensatory support (Jackson and Payne
2003). The removal of ethnic identities in Rwanda rep-
resents a democratic paradox as promotion of equality
has precluded recognition and representation of their
specific needs required to achieve meaningful poverty
alleviation (Beswick 2011). Recognition of their indigen-
ous status or the historical injustices surrounding their
dispossession and detachment from ancestral lands
and traditional practices is not on the horizon through
either national politics or international sustainable devel-
opment governance.
It is important to acknowledge that, although ethni-
city has a considerable influence on the way develop-
ment is experienced, generalizations about the relative
power of ethnic groups do not always hold at a local
level. Findings of this study revealed that Tutsi do not
always form the elite, and that Batwa may exhibit
levels of agency to uphold rights in the face of social
and political barriers. Levels of power are influenced by
long-term socio-economic, political, cultural factors and
psychological factors, at individual and local as well as
national scales.
The centrally-planned modernization and marketiza-
tion drive, and envisioned citizenship which Rwandan
policies promote do not represent a gradual, negotiated
acculturation but a much more engineered future iden-
tity which has undeniably significant impacts (Reyntjens
2011). The positive achievements of service provision are
offset and in many cases overshadowed by the negative
effects to key resources like land and livestock, and
related tenure insecurity and restricted freedom of
choice. Because negative experiences are disproportio-
nately incurred by the poorest and most marginal rural
inhabitants, often threatening their very basic needs,
the rural population is being polarized and social differ-
ence counterproductively being amplified. These
trends, although often overlooked, will play a key role
in Rwanda’s economic, social and political development
in the years to come.
Note
1. Interview respondents frequently shared perspectives
on sensitive or stigmatized issues such as personal
health, intra-household relations and corruption
suggesting a level of trust had been attained. Ethical
clearance was obtained from the host university in
the UK and official permits were obtained from the
Rwanda Development Board. The research project
and purposes (being to study the impacts of change
on the wellbeing of rural inhabitants) were presented
clearly to Rwandan government officials at the
central level in Kigali as well as sector, cell, national
park and village levels in addition to regional military
representatives.
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